This paper examines the role of patent policy in a spatial model of sequential innovation. Initial entrepreneurs develop a new product market and anticipate that subsequent innovation may lead to a product line that consumers value more highly. The likelihood of sequential innovation increases with the number of initial early entrants in the market. Patent protection that encourages early entry can therefore raise the probability of both initial and subsequent innovation. We determine the optimal patent breadth as a function of key industry characteristics of both consumer taste and the new technology.
Sequential Product Innovation, Competition and Patent Policy
This paper explores the role of patent policy in a sequential model of innovation. A common pattern of market evolution is for a number of entrepreneurial startups to lead the initial commercialization of a new invention or technology and be followed later by the entry of a wellestablished firm offering a subsequent innovation that becomes the dominant industry standard. 1 This common pattern-dubbed by Baumol (2010) as a "Davids and Goliath" innovation processhas been well documented by Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) , Kortum and Lerner (2000) , Markides and Geroski (2005) , and Boldrin et al (2011) among others. It is roughly consistent with the entry/exit studies of Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) in manufacturing and Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda (2004) in retail trade.
There is a tension in the above pattern of innovation and market evolution. The late entrant's innovation typically builds on the best designs of the initial entrants 2 , suggesting that the gains from that later innovation rise as the number of initial entrants increases. The more initial entry the greater is the menu of choices for subsequent innovation to build upon. 3 Yet the better the secondgeneration innovation is, the more it threatens the profits of the initial entrants. Recognition of this threat thus deters the initial entry that makes valuable subsequent innovation possible.
We analyze the role of well-designed patent policy in this setting. Building on earlier work [Norman, Pepall and Richards (2008) , referred to hereafter as NPR (2008)] we show that patent policy can play a pro-competitive role by increasing initial entry and thus raising the value of subsequent innovation. We further show that optimal patent strength rises as consumers' taste 1 Well-known examples include: a) Proctor & Gamble's "Pampers" marketed in 1964 more than a decade after the introduction of disposable diapers yet reaching a nearly 90 percent market share by 1968; and b) Microsoft's Excel that built on early spreadsheet programs such as Visi-calc and Lotus to develop the ultimate market winner. 2 Bessen and Maskin (2009) also note how subsequent innovations build upon the designs of earlier innovations. 3 Indeed, this is a major reason that Markides and Geroski (2005) explicitly recommend this "fast second" strategy. Schnars (1991) offers evidence that this is a conscious strategy of many large firms.
for variety in the new market becomes weaker, with the result that in some cases, only a secondbest outcome requiring very strong patents can be achieved.
Our basic model is presented in the next section. Optimal patent breadth policy is analyzed in Section 3. Summary and concluding remarks follow in Section 4.
A Spatial Model of Sequential Innovation
The model is a four stage game that may be briefly summarized as follows. In the first stage a number of initial entrants pioneer a new product market, e.g., information technology, biotechnology, or robotics. Products in the new market are horizontally differentiated with each good represented by a location on the " Salop (1979) circle", a one-dimensional circular space Λ normalized to unit length. If a patent regime is in place, an initial entrant secures a patent that covers some variants of its basic technology. In stage two the initial entrants compete in price for consumers of their new products.
In the third stage there is some probability that a late entrant comes into the market with an improved technology and offers a product line for which consumers are willing to pay more.
Subsequent innovation requires the late entrant to buy a patent of one of the initial entrants. This
occurs in an open auction in which each initial entrant offers to sell its patent at a price equal to its expected future profit. Sequential innovation leads to some initial entrants exiting the market in the third stage. In the fourth and final stage of the game the surviving initial entrants and the late entrant compete in price for customers.
Rational expectation of the sequential innovation deters initial entry. We evaluate the role that patent policy can play in generating the efficient degree of early innovation. Figure 1 presents a timeline of the market evolution implied by the model.
Pioneering the New Market: Stages 1 and 2
Let n initial entrants develop a new market represented by the unit circle. An early initial entrant i sells a new product line based on its recently commercialized and patented technology.
That is, each initial entrant has a patent of strength w, where 0 < w < 1. The patent confers to the firm the exclusive right to produce goods within an arc of length w/n centered on its basic technology represented by the location x i on the circle. In a symmetric outcome, each initial entrant would have 1/nth of the new market but its patent-protected market is limited to w/n.
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The patent strength parameter w is a relative parameter, similar to Klemperer (1990) .
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Consumer preferences are uniformly distributed over the circle at density d which we can normalize to d = 1 without loss of generality. The location of consumer s defines that consumer's most preferred product specification. For each consumer s, the surplus from buying an initial entrant's product with specification x at price p(x) is:
V is the consumer's reservation price and t is the disutility per unit "distance" incurred in buying other than the most preferred product. Each consumer buys exactly one unit of the product per period that offers her the greatest consumer surplus.
Each initial entrant incurs a sunk cost f to locate at x i on the circle. 6 Marginal costs are constant and normalized to zero. The "location" x i of firm i defines its base technology.
Relocation of this base technology is prohibitively costly, but the firm is able to adapt or version its base technology by incurring versioning costs to produce a line of goods that meet a consumer's most preferred specification. Versioning by firm i with base technology x i to product specification x incurs a cost:
4 In a spatial context, it is tempting to view w as a literal breadth measure of specific arc length. In that case the value of w would almost fully determine n, e.g., w = 0.5 would imply the maximum n = 2. Patent policy is better described by a measure of patent strength w to which the number of entrants n responds endogenously. 5 Cohen et al (2000) observe that there are other, non-patent means of protecting intellectual property. In principle, w could reflect all of these. We focus on w as a patent policy measure as that is the most obvious policy intervention. 6 As profit is homogeneous of degree one in consumer density d, we could instead consider sunk costs per capita:
We assume that the versioning cost r < t, otherwise no firm would offer a line of products. We also assume V sufficiently large that all consumers buy a product, i.e., the market is covered.
The versioning technology has two key features (Eaton and Schmitt, 1994; Norman and Thisse, 1999) . First, a consumer is indifferent between product s and a base product x i versioned to s if the two are offered at the same price. Second, and as a result of the above, each firm will price discriminate as Norman and Thisse (1999) show that selling versioned goods at discriminatory prices is a dominant strategy.
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It is insightful to examine how patent strength w influences competition among the initial entrants. Consider a consumer whose "location" is s 1 ∈ w 2n , 1 n       "to the left" of firm i. This is outside the patent protection of either firm i or i -1, so that the latter can perfectly customize its base technology to specification s 1 without infringing i's patent. This implies that the BertrandNash equilibrium price to this consumer is:
Now consider a consumer with location s 0 ∈ 0, w 2n       "to the left" of firm i and therefore within the zone of i's patent protection. The best that neighboring firm i -1 can offer this consumer is the product versioned to the boundary of firm i's patent region. 8 To purchase this product a consumer s 0 has to "travel" a distance w/2n -s 0 , incurring transport costs t(w/2n -s 0 ).
The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price to this consumer is therefore:
The bold line in Figure 2 illustrates the uneven saw-tooth pattern of prices in a BertrandNash equilibrium among n initial entrants assuming some patent protection 1 > w > 0. In the product space centered by the midpoint between any two initial entrants (1/2n from each) and beyond the patent protection of each, the price to any consumer is determined by the versioning cost of which of the two rivals is farthest away. It is r/2n at the midpoint and then rises with slope r with the distance from the farthest rival. However, a rival cannot version to consumers within a firm's patent boundary. Instead, those consumers can, at best, buy the rival's versioned product by incurring the disutility cost t times the distance to the rival's versioned product at the boundary. Thus, within the patent zone, prices rise at the greater slope t up to the maximum at the firm's location of its base technology.
Given the prices above and the assumption of zero marginal cost, each initial entrant's second stage operating profit is:
The second term in (5) is the extra profit the patent regime creates for an initial entrant. As patent strength w grows, an initial entrant's profit rises given the number of entrants n. Higher w thus induces more entry-an effect that grows with the difference between the consumer taste parameter t and versioning cost r. This link between patent policy and the taste parameter t is unique to our analysis of innovation.
Sequential Fast-Second Innovation and Initial Entrant Survival
We are interested in how the opening up by early entrants of a new market signals an opportunity for a later entrant to learn from and improve upon the early innovations. The late entrant enters with a subsequent innovation, which increases the maximum consumer willingness to pay. We consider the not atypical case of a single late entrant, denoted as firm F. Its late entry depends on how much extra value consumers place on its subsequent innovation and the cost of entering. Because F's innovation builds upon an initial entrant's already patented technology, F's entry cost reflects the price of acquiring patent rights.
The intrinsic extra value α consumers place on F's later innovation is treated as a random variable uniformly distributed from 0 to 1. This may because α is the result of a research process with stochastic outcomes. 9 Alternatively, F may be viewed as one firm chosen by Nature from a population of potential F firms, each characterized by an α again uniformly distributed over the 0-1 interval. In either case, a consumer's overall reservation price for a subsequent innovation depends on the α value and is given by: V + (α -1/n). 10 The second term captures the feature that the value of subsequent innovation is greater when there is a richer choice menu or higher number of early innovations n. F's α value and best technology or circle location choice are assumed to be private information. While not necessary, it is analytically convenient to assume:
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Assumption r: r < 1.
Initial entrants anticipate the possibility of subsequent innovation. Each initial entrant i anticipates a double contingency. First, subsequent innovation or F's entry depends on its α value, which is stochastic. Second, if the realized value of α is sufficiently high that F does enter the new market, four possibilities then arise. The first is that the initial entrant i is F's chosen location so that F will buy i's patent. 12 The second is that i's market in the fourth stage of the game is unchanged because at least one initial entrant survives in both directions between i and F 9 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggested interpretation. 10 Pepall and Richards (2002) and NPR (2008) offer a full discussion on the reasonableness of this assumption.
11 This permits monopoly as a possible market outcome as α approaches 1. 12 We limit consideration to the case in which just one patent-holding startup is bought. This is more tractable and roughly consistent with evidence in Cummings and Macintosh (2003) and Cochrane (2005) that while many firms may enter with an eye toward eventually being acquired, relatively few venture-backed firms actually exit this way.
and price discrimination via versioning localizes competition to immediate neighbors. A third possibility is that competition with F will be so intense in stage 4 that firm i exits in the third stage. The final possibility is that all the initial entrants between i and F exit in the third stage and hence, i becomes either the left-or right-hand survivor that now directly competes with F in stage 4. In this case, the fact that i survives implies that it can profitably retain some part of its market segment despite competition from F.
The anticipation of these four possible outcomes affects each initial entrant's expected profit in the complete game and therefore its decision to enter in the first place. Since part of an initial entrant's expected stage 4 profit depends on whether it is bought by F we must therefore derive the expected price at which an entrant may sell F its patent. This price is the expected stage 4
profit the entrant would earn after F's entry, taking into account the stochastic nature of both F's α value and its location choice.
In turn, an initial entrant's expected stage 4 profit depends on whether it is bought by F and, if not, by the probability that it survives F's entry. Since the labeling of initial entrant locations is arbitrary, let us denote F's entry location in stage 3 by x 0 . Subsequent innovation and entry requires that F has α ≥ 1/n. What is the rational expectation for the number n s of initial entrants that will survive F's entry at x 0 given that α ≥ 1/n and α is drawn from a uniform distribution?
A necessary condition for the two initial entrants who are the jth nearest neighbors to F not to survive is that F captures a critical consumer s 0 located within the patent region "to the right" of j (or "to the left" of -j). Consider a consumer s units "to the right" of j and within j's patent region. If this consumer travels "to the right" to buy from F the best offer that F can make is:
The first term in (6) is F's cost of versioning a product to the right-hand boundary of j's patent region. The second is the further cost that consumer s incurs to buy this product. By contrast, if this consumer purchases from F by travelling "to the left", the best offer that F can make is:
with an interpretation similar to (6). When the prices in equations (6) and (7) are equal, a consumer at s is indifferent between purchasing firm F's product either by traveling to the left or right boundary of j's patent region. This implies that the critical value of s is:
Note that if the consumer at s 0 buys from F, then all of j's consumers both to the right of this point and to the left will also buy from F, i.e., if F can capture the consumer distance s 0 "to the right" of initial entrant j then F captures j's entire market. Substitution of (8) into either (6) or (7) implies that the best offer that F can make to a consumer at s 0 is
By contrast, the best offer that the initial entrant firm j can make is
The difference between these two prices is the lowest reservation price advantage allowing F to undercut initial entrant firms j and -j and steal all their customers. That is, incumbent firms j and -j survive F's entry only if F's advantage is , implying a critical α value
To ease calculations of the expected survival rate of initial entrants we treat n as odd and equal to 2m +1. (This loses no generality since we ultimately treat n as a continuous variable either odd or even.) The number of incumbents that can be expected to survive F's entry is:
The first term is the range of α for which F cannot enter in stage 3. The second is the range of α over which the initial entrant 0 is bought out and exits in stage 3, while each term in the summation is the range of α over which the jth nearest neighbors to F are undercut and so exit the market in stage 3. As we would expect, a greater number of initial entrants survive if patents are stronger, as measured by increased w. In addition, a greater number of initial entrants also survives if the taste parameter t is higher, or versioning costs are greater and n > 3.
The probability of an initial entrant surviving F's entry is then:
Let be the profit of either of the two surviving initial entrants nearest firm F when F has parameter value α. Given (13), it is tempting to express an initial entrant's expected stage 4 profit as: . However, the firms not surviving F's entry also include the early entrant firm that exited through sale of its patent to F. Recall that we assume that after learning its α value and its best location, both of which are private information, F acquires a patent by holding an auction in which each initial entrant submits a price B at which it will sell its patent. Competition then forces the equilibrium bid equal to an initial entrant's expected stage 4 profit denoted by . This profit however must include the likelihood (1/n) of winning the auction and payment B. Hence:
Because B must equal expected period two profit , we must have: B = . Hence:
Hence:
The total expected profit for an over the entire game is therefore:
The upper bound of k(α) is π 1 ; i.e., i loses all profit and barely survives F's entry. The lower bound is 0; i.e., i is insulated from F's entry and earns a stage 4 profit equal to π 1 . Hence, an initial entrant's total expected profit for the entire game has upper π U and lower π L bounds:
The equilibrium number of initial entrants is, therefore, bounded by 13 The upper and lower bounds are clear. Precise solutions for k(α) are complex and often hard to express concisely.
(19) Higher t implies stronger consumer preferences for differentiation, dulling price competition. Stronger patents w also dull price competition. Hence, higher taste intensity t or stronger patent strength w encourages initial entry. Note also that the iso-entry contour lines are downward sloping. Stronger consumer taste intensity (higher t) can be associated with weaker patent protection (lower w) while supporting the same degree of initial innovation or entry n e .
That greater patent strength w raises entry merits discussion. It is consistent with the positive entry effects of patents found by Hall and Ziedonis (2001) , among others. Because more entry in our model implies lower price-cost margins overall, it is also consistent with Boldrin and Levine (2013) who document a robust positive correlation between patent strength and price competition across time periods, industrial classification changes, and industries sampled. Second, our model helps make clear that patent policy is about entry, not profit. Higher patent strength w does have a protection effect raising each early entrant's expected profit for a given number of entrants n. Yet there is also an entry effect as higher w raises the equilibrium number of entrants n e . In this light, it is perhaps less surprising that some survey data, e.g., Cohen et al (2000) , finds that entrepreneurs often doubt the value of stronger patent protection as in any 14 It should be obvious that, all else equal, an increase in f will lead to less initial entry.
equilibrium each initial entrant's expected profit is zero regardless of patent strength w. It is the number of entrepreneurial startups, not their profit that stronger patent protection raises.
Optimal Patent Policy under Sequential Innovation
We now consider optimal patent policy. Because it is early innovation that opens up the new market, the optimal policy is the patent width w that yields an equilibrium early entry level n e such that total versioning plus set-up cost less the additional expected surplus the late entrant creates, denoted here as expected net cost, ENC (w, n, f, r) , is minimized subject to the constraint that the initial entrants at least break even. Since the comparative statics are the same for n L and n U , it loses no generality and is analytically convenient to treat n U as n e .
After F's entry, the surplus in stage 4 reflects competition between F and surviving initial entrants. Hence, efficiency requires that an initial entrant survive only if its price is non-negative given F's more highly valued good. Again let F's entry point be x 0 . The jth nearest neighbors to F survive if F's willingness-to-pay advantage is in the interval: . Hence, F's market radius given that the nearest surviving incumbents are incumbents j and -j is:
The market radius for the jth nearest neighbors to F is:
Since the number of initial entrants is n = 2m + 1, one element of expected net cost is then:
The first two terms are the versioning costs incurred by F and by the two surviving jth nearest neighbors to F; the third measures the versioning costs for the remaining surviving initial entrants; and the fourth is the additional surplus that F creates. To this we add the following:
The first bracketed term is expected net cost when all 2m+1 incumbents exit and F enjoys a monopoly. The second bracketed term is initial entrants' versioning costs if F does not enter.
The term r/4n is initial entrants' versioning costs before F enters, while nf is initial entrants' sunk cost in aggregate. Optimal entry n* minimizes expected net cost ECN(n,f,r)=NC 1 +NC 2 . Hence:
Patent policy minimizes ECN(n, f, r) subject to the further constraint that an initial entrant expects to break even. Optimal policy thus solves the constrained optimization problem:
where . We identify necessary conditions for the optimal patent w*(f, t, r).
There are two possible cases: (i) f, r and t are such that the social optimum can be attained by setting an optimal patent width w* < 1; (ii) f, r and t are such that the social optimum cannot be attained even with a patent of maximum width w* = 1. Specifically, our analysis implies that there is a critical value of the consumer taste parameter t, denoted t 1 (w, f, r), above which a patent of width w* < 1 achieves the social optimum but below which we can achieve only second best by setting w* = 1. Formally:
Our analysis then leads to the following result: We illustrate t 1 (w, f, r) in Figure 4 . The solid lines are for r = 0.9 and the dotted lines for r = 0.5.
The curves labeled w = 1 illustrate t 1 (1, f, r) , i.e. the degree of consumer taste intensity that achieves the social optimum with a patent of full width w* = 1. For any parameter values t and f above these curves the Patent Office can achieve the social optimum with a partial patent of width w* < 1. For example, the curves labeled w = 0.8 illustrate t 1 (0.8, f, r): the degree of consumer taste intensity that achieves the social optimum with a patent of width w* = 0.8. For parameter values t and f below t 1 (1, f, r), by contrast, the Patent Office can only achieve second best. With f on the horizontal axis, the downward slope of t 1 (w, f, r) reflects the fact that as f rises t 1 falls. Note that since the r = 0.9 and r = 0.5 curves intersect, there is no such unambiguous relationship between versioning costs and optimal patent strength. We can state the following:
Corollary: If t > t 1 (w, f, r) , the optimal patent strength w*(f, r, t) is decreasing in both sunk development cost f and consumer taste intensity t. However there is a U shaped relationship between optimal patent strength w* and versioning cost r.
The intuition is straightforward. We know [NPR (2008) ] that absent patents, the expectation of F's entry gives n e < n*, i.e., there are too few initial entrants. 15 Further, the degree of suboptimal initial entry, n* -n e , falls as sunk development costs f rise [NPR (2008)]. Hence, the patent strength w*(f, r ,t) necessary to achieve the social optimum falls with f. We can state this another way. As sunk development costs rise, the critical degree of consumer taste intensity necessary for patent strength w to achieve the socially optimum level of initial entry falls.
15 Evidence in Astebro (2003) and Nordhaus (2004) suggests entrepreneurs typically earn only a small fraction of the surplus they generate. The possibility of inefficiently low levels of entrepreneurial activity is real.
Recall from our discussion of Figure 3 that an initial entrant's expected profit is an increasing function of the consumer taste intensity parameter t. In other words, for any given sunk development cost f a stronger taste intensity t allows for a weaker (or narrower) patent strength while still allowing the socially optimum level of initial innovation.
The relation between optimal patent protection w and versioning cost r is more complex.
Relatively low r means intense price competition that discourages entry and innovation. Hence, as r rises and entry increases the patent protection w necessary for optimality declines. However, as r continues to rise it approaches t. When consumers' disutility cost of buying other than their preferred specification is close to a firm's cost of versioning its product, the entry incentive that higher r provides falls [see equation (5)]. Patent strength w must then rise to achieve optimality.
Result 1 indicates that for a sufficiently low consumer taste parameter t, patent strength w can no longer be set to achieve efficient entry. Since r < t, low t means a market with intense price competition lowering the profits that initial entrants derive from patent protection [equation (5)]. This so reduces entry that no feasible value of w can achieve n*(w, f, r). Innovation will always be too low. The best that can be done is to set w at its maximum of w* = 1, resulting in entry as close as possible to n* subject to the constraint that an initial entrant expects zero profit.
Summary and Conclusion
Much research on innovation and patent policy, e.g., O'Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse (1998), Hunt (2004) , and Bessen and Maskin (2009) emphasizes the sequential nature of the innovative process in which later innovations build on earlier ones. A somewhat parallel literature, e.g., Baumol (2010) recognizes that sequential innovation is often characterized by an initial technological breakthrough pioneered by a number of small entrepreneurial firms that are later displaced by a late entrant playing a "fast second" role and selling a product line in the new market for which consumers are willing to pay more. This is typically part of a shakeout process in which many of the initial early entrants exit. [Baumol (2010) : Boldrin and Levine (2013) ].
This paper offers a sequential innovation model capturing both these stylized facts. In a Salop (1979) differentiated market framework, we show that optimal patent protection is positive. Absent patent protection, initial innovative entry is suboptimally low, especially in new markets where products are little differentiated in the eyes of consumers. Such markets make for intense price competition, which deters innovative entry unless patent strength w is raised. For sufficiently low differentiation, optimal patent strength is set at its maximum w*=1.
The need to buy the patent rights of an initial entrant makes subsequent innovation less likely. However, patent protection also induces startup entry and this raises the chance of later innovation for two reasons. First, as Bessen and Maskin (2009) among others note, it enriches the menu of innovations from which later innovators can choose to build on thereby raising the likelihood of success. Second, more initial entry intensifies price competition and that reduces the price the late entrant has to pay to acquire the patent rights that its entry requires.
Our model makes clear that the primary impact of stronger patents is to raise initial entry, not profit. This is consistent with evidence in Hall and Ziedonis (2001) , and Boldrin et al (2011) , among others. It is also consistent with leading entrepreneurial textbooks, such as Barringer and Ireland (2012) and surveys such as Graham et al (2009) , both of which view patents as entryinducing because they provide property that an initial entrant can later sell to a large established firm. Indeed, a patent may be necessary as collateral to obtain the funding required for entry.
In short, strong patents can enhance the gains from innovation beyond the first generation of innovators. They can do so particularly in cases in which the new goods are difficult to differentiate so that price competition is intense. To our knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate the linkage between optimal patent strength and consumer taste for differentiated products. 
